The Accidental Russophile

I saw this on Very Russian Tochka Net. He says this has been around the Russian blogosphere lately, but I hadn’t yet seen it .. well, at least not before this evening. It is supposedly from a Soviet police memo identifying ethnic types. Katja very quickly assessed its accuracy for each type without a second thought.

Top: Russian, Ukrainian, Tatar, Jewish, “Tsigan” (Gypsy or Romany), Kyrghyz.
Middle: Belarusian, Lithuanian, Georgian, Armenian, Kazakh, Uzbek.
Bottom: Latvian, Estonian, Azeri, Moldovan, Turkmen.

Questions about ethnic stereotyping aside, it seems to me there are various ethnic groups missing – off the top of my head – Komi, Buryat, Chechen, and Chukchi (there are only 15,000, but they are the topic of so many jokes).

West Has Failed to Learn From 9/11 – Sergei Karganov (Сергей Караганов)

I happened upon this commentary by Dr. Sergei Karganov and thought it was extremely well written and thought out – to the point were excerpting it was difficult. So you will get the commentary in its entirity. English translation is from Mosnews and original Russian is from Российская Газета (Rossiyskaya Gazeta).

Выигранный бой. Проигрываемая война.

Не хотел писать эту статью сразу после годовщины чудовищного теракта 11 сентября 2001 г. Главный тезис статьи – мир проигрывает войну терроризму – прозвучал бы неприличным диссонансом на фоне горестных воспоминаний о многочисленных безвинных жертвах, погибших в этот день.

Но не писать о том, что уроки 11 сентября были не восприняты или восприняты неправильно, было бы безответственным и перед памятью жертв, и с точки зрения профессиональной этики.

Поражение в антитеррористической войне идет не по всем направлениям. Есть и отдельные победы. Хотя по большей части тактические. Мы, давшие в Чечне первый бой экспансии воинствующего исламского терроризма, выиграли его, хотя и чудовищной ценой.

Планы по созданию исламского халифата от Черного до Каспийского моря с вероятным последующим продвижением вверх по Волге были сорваны. Те в России, кто тяготел к воинствующей ветви ислама и поддерживался из-за рубежа, получили жестокий урок. Ваххабитских медресе в России теперь, насколько я знаю, больше нет.

Был выигран бой, но не битва. Россия пошла по пути военно-психологического сдерживания экстремизма и сепаратизма. Но было очень мало сделано для ослабления причин их порождающих – бедности, низкого уровня развития в ряде регионов Северного Кавказа, населенных преимущественно российскими мусульманами.

Одержали две тактические победы и американцы. С нашей и иранской помощью они разгромили талибов, неумолимо накатывавшихся на южные республики бывшего СССР. “Аль-Каида” лишилась многих баз. Но не пропала и не была уничтожена.

Другая тактическая победа Вашингтона – ему удастся с помощью мер внутренней безопасности, сильно подорвавших привлекательность американского общества, избежать повторения трагедии 11 сентября. Пока.

Спецслужбам по отдельности, а иногда и в сотрудничестве удалось предотвратить немало терактов в России, других странах Европы. Но немало страшных терактов было совершено.

Но не это главное. Решив, что с терроризмом надо бороться насильственным насаждением демократии, американцы влезли в Ирак. Политически войну они уже проиграли. Страна на годы погрузилась в пучину гражданской войны, стала огромным полигоном для подготовки будущих террористов всех мастей. Когда американцев уйдут, а это событие, не за горами, весь этот теринтернационал начнет расползаться во все стороны. Боюсь, что и в нашем направлении.

Выяснилось то, что было очевидно и до того. Масштабными военными операциями сетевые структуры типа “Аль-Каиды” разрушить невозможно. Похоже, что они наоборот разрастаются.

За прошедшие годы не было сделано почти ничего для развития осмысленного и широкого диалога цивилизаций, для содействия вовлечению в мягкую модернизацию отстающих от передового мира государств и элит мусульманского Ближнего Востока.

Запад, вернее, американское руководство, так и не удосужилось понять, что антизападные, антихристианские настроения носят по большей части не ценностный, не культурный и даже не религиозный характер. Бен Ладен особенно не ругает западную культуру. Во многом эти настроения порождены явно несправедливой политикой Запада в отношении стран региона. Помноженное на его историческое отставание, о причинах которого я не раз упоминал на этих страницах, это ощущение порождает расширяющийся и углубляющийся мусульманский “веймарский синдром”.

Но в растущих антизападных настроениях виноват не только Запад. Множащиеся последователи бен Ладена не только обороняются или мстят. Они и наступают. Цель – искоренить западное и вообще внешнее военно-политическое влияние на расширенном Ближнем Востоке, уничтожить относительно умеренные исламские режимы и установить власть радикального политического ислама.

Хуже всего то, что, поняв, что из-за чудовищных ошибок США или фактического бездействия Европы Запад проигрывает, его страны перешли к оборонительной политике и на идеологическом фронте. Не нужно оправдывать глупые карикатуры в датской газете или не совсем политически корректное последнее заявление папы Бенедикта об “агрессивности ислама”. Он извиняется, да еще на официальном уровне, за глупости или неточные формулировки на фоне организованных погромов, которые якобы спровоцированы ими.

Это умиротворение агрессора, разжигающее аппетиты воинствующих исламистов, создающее у них впечатление, что Запад (а в их глазах мы являемся частью Запада, хотя и более слабой и менее злонамеренной) можно победить.

Агрессивное и неудачное насаждение демократии, вызывающее протест и насмешки, вкупе с идеологическим умиротворением абсурдных требований, особенно на фоне тех потоков оскорблений и угроз, которые мир слышит в отношении Запада, христианства и иудейства из уст религиозных и официальных деятелей расширенного Ближнего Востока, выглядит просто политическим инфантилизмом.

Что делать России в ситуации, когда из-за гремучей смеси демократического и исламского мессианизма, агрессивности и умиротворения мир скатывается к войне цивилизаций? Первое – не оказаться полем боя этой войны, на которое нас услужливо подталкивают.

Второе. Максимально быстро развивать структуры сотрудничества и безопасности для региона Центральной Азии и Среднего Востока вместе со странами, которые еще не наделали ошибок, имеют авторитет. Это прежде всего – Индия и Китай. ШОС может заполнить вакуум недоверия и безопасности и отвести войну цивилизаций.

Третье. Бороться, сколько можно, против распространения ядерного оружия в регионе расширенного Ближнего Востока совместно со всеми возможными партнерами, но не за наш счет. Мы – против того, чтобы Иран стал ядерной державой, но мы не хотим и не можем позволить себе враждовать с ним.

Четвертое. Если ядерное оружие начнет расползаться, попадет в руки безответственных групп или террористов, что достаточно вероятно в результате, например, предсказуемого социально-политического взрыва в Пакистане, нужно быть готовыми к самым решительным мерам. Наши официальные лица отрицают применение ядерного оружия в любой ситуации, но полагаю, что мы не имеем права исключать даже такую возможность.

Наконец, пятое. Необходимо удесятерение усилий по смягчению конфликта, по расширению диалога цивилизаций, избежание нашего впутывания в цивилизационный конфликт. Мы должны занять политику вооруженного нейтралитета. Но он, как известно, полным никогда не бывает. Нужно пытаться избегать ситуации, когда нам придется делать выбор. Мы его уже один раз сделали в Чечне. Будет обидно, если из-за глупости, мессианизма, фанатизма или политического эскапизма других нам снова придется делать такой выбор.

“I did not want to write this article right after the anniversary of the appalling terrorist act of September 11, 2001. The main theme of the article — the thesis that the world is losing the war on terrorism — would have clashed inappropriately with the poignant tributes to the many innocent victims who died that day. The choice not to write about the failure to learn the lessons of 9/11 or about the misinterpretation of these lessons would have been irresponsible, however, from the standpoint of professional ethics and it would have been an affront to the memory of those victims.

”The war on terrorism is not failing everywhere. There have been some isolated victories, although most of them have been of the tactical variety. We were the first to fight against the expansion of militant Islamic terrorism in Chechnya, and we won that fight, but at an outrageous price. The plans to establish an Islamic caliphate from the Black Sea to the Caspian, with a strong possibility of subsequent movement up the Volga, were crushed. People in Russia who were drawn to the militant branch of Islam and were supported by forces from abroad were taught a grim lesson. As far as I know, there are no Wahhabite seminaries in Russia now.

“We won the fight, but not the battle. Russia chose to rely on the military-psychological containment of extremism and separatism. Too little was done, however, to eliminate their causes: the poverty and underdevelopment of some regions in the North Caucasus, inhabited primarily by Russian Muslims.

”The Americans also won two tactical victories. With our help and Iran’s, they routed the Taliban, who had been moving inexorably into the southern republics of the former Soviet Union. Al-Qaida lost many of its bases, but it did not expire and it was not eliminated. Washington’s other tactical victory was its ability to avert a repetition of the tragic events of September 11 — so far — with the help of internal security measures that seriously undermined the appeal of the American society. The special services, separately and sometimes in concert, managed to prevent many terrorist acts in Russia and other European countries, but many terrible terrorist acts nevertheless were committed.

“This is not the main thing, however. The Americans decided that terrorism had to be combated by forcing democracy on people and clambered into Iraq. They have already lost the political war. The country is mired in civil war and has become a huge training ground for future terrorists of every hue. When the Americans leave, and this event is not that distant, this entire international group of terrorists will start spreading out in all directions. I am afraid they will be moving in our direction too. This proved something that had already seemed obvious enough. Networks like Al-Qaida cannot be destroyed by broad-scale military operations. In fact, this seems to promote their growth.

”Almost nothing has been done in the last few years to foster sensible and extensive dialogue between civilizations or to promote participation in the gentle modernization of the Middle East Muslim states and elite, which are lagging behind the progressive countries.

“The West — or, to put it more precisely, the American leadership — never took the trouble to understand that most of the anti-Western and anti-Christian attitudes do not stem from differing values or from cultural and religious differences. Bin Laden does not have many negative things to say about Western culture. These attitudes are largely a result of the West’s unfair treatment of the countries of that region. This impression, compounded by the region’s underdevelopment, the causes of which I have enumerated more than once in this newspaper, has given rise to an increasingly common and increasingly serious Muslim ”Weimar syndrome.“

”The mounting anti-Western sentiment cannot be blamed solely on the West, however. Bin Laden’s rapidly multiplying followers are not only defending themselves and avenging themselves. They are also taking offensive action. Their goal is the eradication of Western influence and, in general, all outside military-political influence in the Middle East, the elimination of the relatively moderate Islamic regimes, and the triumph of radical political Islam.

“The worst thing of all is that the West, realizing that it is losing either because of the United States’ outrageous blunders or because of the essential inactivity of Europe, is now on the defensive even on the ideological front. There is no need to justify stupid cartoons in a Danish newspaper or Pope Benedict’s recent statement about ”aggressive Islam,“ which was not exactly politically correct. There have been apologies, official ones at that, for the stupidity and the poorly worded phrases, in view of the organized pogroms they supposedly have sparked.

”These conciliatory efforts by the aggressor are whetting the appetites of the militant Islamists and convincing them that the West can be beaten (furthermore, they see us as part of the West, although a weaker and less malicious part). The aggressive and unsuccessful inculcation of democracy, which evoked protests and ridicule, combined with the ideological appeasement of absurd demands, especially in view of all the insults and threats religious leaders and officials in the Middle East are hurling at the West, Christianity, and Judaism, seems positively infantile in the political sense.

“What should Russia do in this situation, now that this volatile mixture of democratic and Islamic messianism, aggression, and appeasement has driven the world to the verge of a war between these civilizations? First, we must not become a battlefield in this war, regardless of how earnestly we are being encouraged to do this.

”Second, we must develop the structures for cooperation and security in Central Asia and the Middle East as quickly as possible with countries which still have some credibility because they have not made too many mistakes. Above all, these include India and China. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization could fill the vacuum of trust and security and avert the war between civilizations.

“Third, we must fight as much as possible against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East with every possible partner, but not at our expense. We do not want Iran to be a nuclear power, but we do not want a hostile relationship with Iran and we cannot afford to have Iran as an enemy.

”Fourth, if the proliferation of nuclear weapons begins, and they start falling into the hands of irresponsible groups or terrorists, which easily could happen as a result of, for example, the predicted sociopolitical upheavals in Pakistan, we must be ready to take the most resolute steps. public officials renounce the use of nuclear weapons in any situation, but I think we cannot exclude even this possibility.

“The fifth and final thing we must do is to make ten times the effort to deescalate the conflict, to expand the dialogue between civilizations, and to avoid involvement in this conflict. We must take a stance of armed neutrality. Everyone knows that it can never be absolute, however. We have to avoid situations forcing us to make a choice. We already made this choice once in Chechnya. It would be too bad if we were to be forced to make this choice again by the stupidity, messianism, fanaticism, or political escapism of others.”

Georgia: Russian Base In Batumi Enters Its Last Phase

Nata Imedaishvili reports on Russia’s continued withdrawal from their former base in Batumi, Georgia. As of today, only two families and five soldiers remain. Lost in all the hype and political spin of the last week is the fact that Russia remains committed to closing military base #12.

A merchant who identified himself only as “Mr. Karlo” runs a small kiosk located just 10 meters from the entrance to base No. 12. The location places him in a unique position to observe the daily goings-on at the imposing structure.

“It is no longer a base. Only several soldiers are left, who will stay only until the territory is handed over. Several officers with families,” Karlo said. “They were supposed to empty the territory, and move to Khelvachauri by the end of September. But they are still here.”

That is expected to change under the terms of the new deal, which was worked out by Russian and Georgian negotiators in Sochi in late March and ratified by the Russian State Duma on October 6. The agreement sets the terms of operation of Russian military bases and facilities in Russia, and the transit of Russian armaments across Georgian soil.

It dictates that Russian soldiers serving at base No. 12 evacuate the base and move to another Russian facility in nearby Khelvachauri before eventually being relocated to a base in Gyumri, Armenia.

Karlo says that despite the recent tension between Georgia and Russia, the local population has good relations with the soldiers who serve in Batumi.

“We help them, give them things that they pay for in installments,” Karlo said. “We have good relations, but the soldiers are somewhat… when they first arrived here, they would not receive salaries for the whole year, and were dependent on us for bread and other things. They would come and ask me for a shot of vodka — ‘Give me 100 grams of vodka, uncle Karlo.’ This is how they were. Now they have cars and money, and no longer communicate with us. However, nobody is going to insult them in any way. And they also do not behave in a provocative manner.”

The Moscow Skyscraper

Just a quick note, for those that might be interested. The Sundance Channel is showing the 2004 documentary “The Moscow Skyscraper” by Pavel Lounguine (Павел Лунгин). The film is about the Kotelnicheskaya Naberezhnaya (Котельническая набережная).

Documentary filmmaker Pavel Lounguine casts a critical eye on Russian society and history by focusing on the story of a monumental apartment building designed to house Stalin’s KBG officers and the Moscow elite. Built by prisoners of war and Gulag detainees, the massive neo-gothic high-rise still houses descendants of Stalin’s inner circle, who now prize their prime Moscow real estate. Focusing on the skyscraper’s current inhabitants, Louguine paints an ironic and revealing profile of a country still riven by the dark shadows of its past.

The documentary will be shown at 16:30 and 22:30 today and at 5:45 and 13:30 on October 24th. Katja and I will be watching this in about an hour with an eye towards writing a short review.

A filmography of Pavel Lounguine includes:

• The Island (2006)
• The Moscow Skyscraper (2004)
• Tycoon: A New Russian (Oligarkh) (2002)
• The Wedding (Svadba) (2000)
• Line of Life (Liniya Zhizni) (1996)
• Luna Park (1992)
• Eastern Romance (Vostochnyy Roman) (1992)
• Taxi Blues (Taksi-Blyuz) (1990)
• The Christians (Khristiane) (1987)
• Poputchik (1986)
• Nepobedimyy (1983)
• Everything’s the Wrong Way (Vsyo Naoborot) (1981)
• Konets Imperatora Taygi (1978)
• Vsyo Delo v Brate (1976)

Reuters and Russian news agencies are reporting that Novaya Gazeta reporter Anna Politkovskaya was found shot dead outside her apartment block in Moscow.

Politkovskaya is well known in the West and Russia for her Chechen war reporting and is the author of The Dirty War and Putin’s Russia. She had reported previous threats and attempts on her life by agents of the FSB. In 2004, she had taken ill on a flight to Beslan in a suspected poisoning.

I’ll have more on this story later today.

So, where to begin on the murder of Anna Politkovskaya – a Russian news reporter who was born in New York City of the Soviet ruling elite (her parents were Soviet Ukrainian diplomats) and never as widely accepted within Russia as she was in the West. And while the BBC obituary applauds her for “honest journalism”, there have been critics of her writing and reporting who cite her for wholesale invention … or at the very least, distortion. I will say no more than that – Об умерших либо хорошо, либо никак.

Media outlets across the US and Western world will cite the contract killings and attacks on other Russian journalists. The Russian death toll for journalists was certainly troublesome over the past decade, with now 13 journalists murdered since Putin became President of the Russian Federation, two in 2005 and now four murdered in 2006 (thus far). Before Americans become too smug regarding these details, we should remember that despite a supposed “free press” we have our own history of violence against reporters and journalists as well (the Alan Berg murder and Dan Rather assault come to mind in recent years).

Even more bizarre is the fact that the murder occurred on Vladimir Putin’s birthday (October 7) – a fact which might tie the murder to some misguided miscreant’s idea of a vengeful birthday gift for her writing and open dislike of the immensely popular Putin. Given that it was an apparent contract killing, I don’t believe this was coincidental and whomever did the killing felt they were making some sort of gift to Putin. This seems even more true given the importance of birthdays and gifts within Russia – it is very common for employees to give a party and gifts to their boss on his birthday.

It is a tragedy that Anna Politkovskaya life was taken from her. She was a gifted writer. I wish the best for her children, family, and friends.

Anna Politkovskaya, Russia’s Secret Heroes of the Chechen War, excerpted from A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya

Anna Politkovskaya: Putin, poison and my struggle for freedom / Culture / Russian London

From an Associated Press article today:

Politkovskaya, 48, had collected witness accounts and photos of tortured bodies and the article had been due for publication Monday, her newspaper’s editors said. “We never got the article, but she had evidence about these (abducted) people and there were photographs,” Novaya Gazeta’s deputy editor, Vitaly Yerushensky, told Ekho Moskvy radio.

In a recent radio interview, Politkovskaya said that she was a witness in a criminal case against Moscow-backed Chechen Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov, whose security forces have been accused of kidnapping civilians and other abuses.

“These are cases of kidnappings, including one criminal case concerning an abduction personally involving Ramzan Kadyrov, a kidnapping of two people, whose photographs are now on my desk,” she said in comments rebroadcast Sunday by Ekho Moskvy.

In the interview, which Ekho Mosvky said had been granted to Radio Free Europe, she said that the victims, an ethnic Russian and a Chechen, were “rounded up, kidnapped for a time and killed. Their bodies showed signs of serious torture.”

Politkovskaya was one of the most persistent critics of Kadyrov’s security forces, but she had crossed many powerful people, including in the Russian military, with her investigative reporting and human rights advocacy.

За сведения об убийцах А.Политковской заплатят 25 млн руб. (25 Million Rubles offered for information on Anna Politkovskaya’s murder)

АНЯ (Anya) by Novaya Gazeta, her newspaper

Lenta.ru: Кавказ: Рамзан Кадыров потрясен убийством Анны Политковской (Kavkaz: Ramzan Kadyrov Shaken by Murder Anna Politkovskaya)

Assassin’s bullet kills fiery critic of Putin

Death of the woman who shamed Moscow – Sunday Times – Times Online

Sanitisation in Chechnya

Russians remember killed reporter

The hitmen who stalk Russia

Outrage greets slaying of top Russian journalist

Georgian Wine and Water Will Return – When Quality is Assured

Federal Consumer Rights Oversight Service head Gennady Onishchenko told Interfax on Friday that Georgian mineral water (predominantly Borjomi) and wines can return to the Russian marketplace when proof of quality is there. “The principle is the same: you can return after you prove quality is there,” said Onishchenko, who doubles as Russia’s chief epidemiologist.

Of course, this issue is clearly political as there is virtually no quality control being enforced on any other bottled-water or wine products in Russia. There is also no explanation of what measures must be undertaken to prove the quality of the Georgian products. I’ll call this – selective enforcement of the laws.

Given the state of much of Russia’s drinking water, if the government really enforced water quality standards, many people would have no water to drink. There are just certain cities in Russia where you don’t drink the tap-water without boiling it first (this is even with consideration for the Russian habit of drinking boiled water regardless of quality).

As Katja drinks Borjomi daily for her stomach problems, this is an issue closer to home for us. If for nothing else, she is thankful for being in the US these days simply because we can special order Borjomi from Russiantable.com for $1.75 for a 1-liter bottle.

There is no doubt that there are fake bottled water products and fake wine products on the shelves of Russian stores. But it isn’t exclusively a Georgian problem, regardless of what Onishchenko and the Russian government might say.

In the end, perhaps it is a good thing for Georgia and Borjomi. It forces them to bring their water to European and American markets where it can compete with Perrier and San Pellegrino in the premium mineral water marketplace.

I subscribe to Mike Averko’s Quick Takes email newsletter (if you are interested in Russia you should be doing the same). I find Mike routinely points out interesting and provocative (in a good way) articles and thoughts regarding topics and viewpoints in the Russian sphere. I truly think this is the role of a very good journalist or columnist – the discussion should make you think and the very best writers challenge your preconceived notions.

With that being said, Mike’s October 5-6 Quick Takes had the following point to make regarding the current Russian-Georgian conflict:

Outside View: The Russia-Georgia Divide
A number of individuals were aware of these realities awhile back. In some circles, such realities only become acknowledged when the media elites controlling the editing process decide that it’s okay to release what had been obvious.

Dispute With Russia Threatens Georgia
This NYT article has a noticeably different slant from the one linked just before it.

So, let’s see what each of these articles has to say. From the World Peace Herald article by Victor Litovkin, Georgia’s Illegal Actions, cited above:

The circus show, poorly orchestrated and performed by the Georgian security services, is over. The four arrested Russian officers were deported to Russia after five days in prison, and arrived in Moscow safe and sound.

Nevertheless, Russia’s economic, transport, bank and postal blockade of Georgia in response to what President Vladimir Putin called an “act of state terrorism”, has not been lifted. Nobody can guarantee that the Georgian authorities will stop their illegal actions against Russian citizens in Georgia.

The outrageous impudence and brazen provocations of the Georgian leadership towards Russia and its citizens have become typical of what the West still calls “Georgia’s most successful democratic government.” It is hard to judge of “the successes of the Georgian economy” if the very existence of the Tbilisi ruling elite depends on the aid of its Western sponsors.

As for the “democratic” character of President Mikhail Saakashvili and his ministers, the arrest of the Russian officers speaks for itself. The officers arrived in Georgia a couple of months ago to organize troop withdrawal. They were accused of spying, establishing an espionage network, preparing a coup d’etat, and staging acts of terror at power transmission lines in Kavkasioni. They were also charged with the explosion of a car in the town of Gori last year, as a result of which three people died and 18 were wounded. The officers must have been very busy!

No conclusive evidence was presented to buttress these accusations. There was only a poorly doctored tape with a recording of some car conversations, whereby one officer handed money to the locals — either for spying, or as payment for chacha (Georgian home-brew).

And from the NY Times article Dispute With Russia Threatens Georgia by Daria Vaisman (International Herald Tribune) cited by Mike:

Marina Tutberidze’s husband works in Moscow, illegally, at a construction site, sending home much of the money he earns. Now an escalating confrontation between Georgia and Russia has left that support in doubt, along with much of Georgia’s economy.

Russia’s decision to sever transportation links — including flights, trains and ferries between the countries — has left Georgians and their businesses scrambling to cope with the disappearance of their country’s biggest and closest market. Millions of dollars in Georgian goods are languishing at customs terminals, even as Moscow-bound travelers seek ways around the transportation disruptions.

In Russia, Georgians faced investigations that have already closed several businesses, including a second Georgian-owned casino on Wednesday. The Russian news media have been almost universally hostile to Georgia in their reports, comparing Georgia’s president, Mikheil Saakashvili, to Hitler or to Lavrenti P. Beria, the secret police chief in the Stalin era. President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia also made the Beria comparison this week.

Russian newspapers reported that the authorities were checking lists of Georgian migrants and would soon raid dozens of businesses. Ms. Tutberidze, speaking through an interpreter, said her husband feared arrest and deportation if he left his living quarters.

Russia has shown no sign that it intends to ease the pressure, despite the release Monday of four Russian military officers, whose arrests last week precipitated the latest deterioration of relations. In Moscow on Wednesday, Mr. Putin warned Georgia in unusually harsh terms. “I would not allow anyone to talk to Russia in the language of provocation and blackmail,” he told parliamentary leaders.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe appealed to each country to tone down the war of words and actions, but Russian lawmakers vowed to toughen, not ease, the economic sanctions against Georgia, their southern neighbor.

Additional steps could include a ban on all money transfers to Georgia, which could hit hardest the poorest Georgians, who rely on money from an estimated 500,000 Georgians who live and work in Russia. The World Bank has estimated that that money amounts to 10 percent of Georgia’s gross domestic product. In Georgia, officials sounded defiant and resigned. Mr. Saakashvili and others have said that the country would learn to do without Russian trade, if necessary. The chief of the central bank, Roman Gotsiridze, told Reuters that Georgia would seek to block Russia’s bid to join the World Trade Organization as long as the sanctions were in effect.

The current sanctions followed several punitive trade barriers, including a Russian ban on wine and mineral water, the major Georgian exports to Russia. “Businesses were ready for the worst-case scenario after the problems with wine and water,” said Giorgi Isakadze, the leader of the Georgian Business Association. Russia closed the principal land crossing into Georgia, Kazbegi, in July, forcing Georgian exporters to find other ways.

“The border has been closed for some time,” said Esben Emborg, the Georgia country director for Nestlé. Amy Denman, executive director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Tbilisi, said that Russia’s new sanctions would raise shipping costs for international companies like Nestlé, Colgate, Motorola and Philip Morris. “The embargo has definitely irritated them and made their life more difficult,” she said. The sanctions could force companies to look outside Russia for markets and supplies, she said, adding, “The feeling is that Russia is shooting itself in the foot a little here.”

Even so, Georgians fear that Russia could exert more pressure, particularly on the gas supply. Russia’s gas monopoly, Gazprom, has promised to maintain supplies to Georgia, but many here recall the brief shut-off last winter after a mysterious explosion on a gas pipeline that Mr. Saakashvili blamed on the Russians.

But for now Russia’s tough stance has strengthened support for Mr. Saakashvili, who has vowed to steer Georgia free of Russia’s influence, at times with provocative words and actions of his own, like the arrests of the Russian officers last week.

Even opposition groups that have previously attacked Mr. Saakashvili have portrayed Russia’s actions as a punitive response to Georgia’s desire to be integrated into Europe and NATO. That, some say, could build Mr. Saakashvili’s political support.

“Having Russia as an enemy was used before and is used now as a unifying factor and a symbol of strength,” said Tinatin Khidasheli, leader of the rival Republican Party. “The higher voice you use against Russia, the braver you appear.”

Reading both articles, I found myself having more questions about the obviously critical or sarcastic tone of the first article – rather than the sympathetic tone of the second article. What do you expect, I’m an American and opinions are shaped by reporting. The first article is an alien (in this case, Russian) point of view for most Americans.

I wrote the following questions to Mike, hoping to hear his response (he is usually quite good in replying if you take the time to ask his opinion).

Read through the NY Times and Victor Litovkin on World Peace Herald that you cited. The tone is definitely different, but the Litovkin piece left me with these thoughts.

I wonder … when Russia arrested those Brits last year with scant evidence and accused them of spying … if that was also an “act of state terrorism” and an “illegal action” and “outrageous impudence and brazen provocations of the (Russian) leadership towards (the United Kingdom)”?

Would the UK have been justified to treat Russia in the wake of that fiasco – as Russia is now treating Georgia? Should the UK have kicked out all Russian citizens, withdrawn their diplomats, and cracked down on all Russian business enterprises in the UK? Even my Russian friends in Moscow didn’t believe all that business about that “rock” being some high-tech gadget.

And, as regards the accusations that the Georgian leadership is being propped up with Western monies (maybe they mean the 1.5% of Georgian GDP that comes from the oil pipeline) – one has to wonder if such an accusation would need to be made, if Russia had not done everything in its power to squeeze the Georgian economy? I mean, after Putin always making a show of having a glass of Borjomi on his table – now you can’t even buy it (legally) in Russia? If the West now did give some generous economic aid to Georgia (very unlikely given that it didn’t happen with Ukraine), doesn’t it become a self-fulfilling prophecy on the part of Russian officials?

I’ve really been struck with how Russian anger and response towards Georgia far exceeds the Georgian “provocation”. There is an emotional factor in play there that exceeds reason. Perhaps some of this is historical between Georgia and Russia.

My feeling is this all goes back to the BTC oil pipeline, and the Russian government being pissed off that they are being bypassed somewhat in the pipeline game. Russia has refused pipeline sharing agreements – maybe for good reasons, as they want to assert more control over their oil assests and the price in the marketplace. Western powers, being the purchaser of oil and gas, seek to have as many suppliers as possible – are directly opposed to this.

The BTC pipeline – particularly if it is expanded and tied into by Kazakhstan (Aktau-Baku Oil pipeline and Gas pipeline projects) represents some threat to Russia being able to assert greater price control in the oil and gas marketplace.

Mike appreciated the comments and felt I brought up some good points:

Nice reply, which I ‘d like to post with a detailed follow-up [...]

Actually, the Russian government isn’t pleased with Britain’s harboring of Boris Berezovsky and Akhmed Zakayev.

Whatever happened with that rock incident?

As you know, I previously likened Mikheil Saakashvili as Russia’s Hugo Chavez in the sense that both like to stick it to the power in their neighborhood.

There’s something to your fossil fuel connection. I sense that there would still be tensions were it not a factor.

Katja and I watched вокзал для двоих (Railway Station for Two) on Sunday night, and I have to say I was pleasantly surprised. It isn’t any heavy weight movie, but none the less was quite charming. I hadn’t heard much about it before viewing – if you haven’t yet seen it, I would say it is worth watching.

The story is about Platon Ryabinin (Oleg Basilashvili), a Moscow pianist in his late 40s. He is traveling by train and at a short railway station stop, he attempts to get something to eat. It is a very hurried crowd who run to and from the train, hoping to eat before its depature. Platon finds the meal unacceptable, doesn’t eat and tries to leave the restaurant without paying. Vera (Lyudmila Gurchenko), the waitress, stops him and the two begin to argue about payment. She eventually calls the police to extract the 1 ruble, 20 kopek cost of the meal. Meanwhile, we see Platon’s train leaving in the background.

From this point, Vera and Platon keep finding each other around the railway station, and slowly we learn about Platon’s situation and fate. Slowly the find themselves forgiving the prior argument and even feeling for each other.

Mixed into this is a youngish Nikita Mikhalkov as Andrei, a train conductor-hoodlum-businessman and Vera’s boyfriend. As a side note, Mikhalkov always seems to play the same character or personality in his films – I’ve yet to see a broad range or expression or language from him. His role here is rather small.

I won’t reveal too much regarding the ending, only that it provides a mixture of romance and dark comedy that only a Russian film could create. This film was released in 1982 and set in that time.

One of the things that Katja and I joked about during the film was “Hey, don’t these people know they are OPPRESSED?!” There are scenes of people dancing and playing, talking back to police, bargaining at local markets, and other aspects of a rather normal life. Even the Siberian prison at the end has a sort of human kindness aspect.

Another interesting aspect of the movie is that Platon’s situation seems to be rather accepted by him and everyone involved. This lends it a certain tragic nature. While this story could be told in the USA, it would certainly involve a great many more lawyers and might have had a much better outcome for Platon.

I’ll leave the details of any discussion regarding the accuracy of that period as portrayed in the film to those who lived within Russia at that time.

Russia Blog: Russia Issues Blockade Against Georgia

I had been looking for an opportunity to write something about the escalating conflict between Georgia and Russia. I’ve commented about it on several other blogs, but simply haven’t put the time into attempting to create a complete picture of what is happening between the two countries.

Yuri Mamchur of Russia Blog has put together a really rather complete picture of all the issues involved. However, I will add some points that he hasn’t touched upon.

Putin has been quick to suggest that outside powers (other nations) are at work in this conflict, escalating the crisis. This plays very well within Russia, which has been as quick to sieze upon this idea – as Americans were to sieze upon the idea that Saddam Hussein was a threat to the US.

However, there is scant evidence for it in either case.

If anything, the US and western powers want the situation in Georgia to calm down, and Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia act as an impedement to resolving the crisis (at least from the Georgian side).

The question you should be asking is – why would the west even care about Georgia at all – and why would they like to see this conflict resolved? As with most things these days, it all goes back to oil. This is an issue that Russia Blog did fail to touch upon.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC) connects the oil-rich (but land-locked) Caspian Sea region with the Mediterranean, bringing oil to western markets. This is the second longest pipeline in the world and its location was specifically selected through Georgia to avoid possible conflicts with Russia and Iran (which would have been easier construction routes).

So with this pipeline in mind and recently falling oil prices – who stands to benefit from a conflict between Russia and Georgia? There are only two possible answers: either Mikhail Saakashvili benefits within the borders of Georgia by appearing strong against Russia (an option discussed by Yuri Mamchur); or Russia benefits by the uncertainity of a regional conflict driving up oil prices. There is no outcome that creates a benefit for anyone in the West.

From a November 2004 Energy Security article by Gal Luft of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security:

Much of the stability along the BTC corridor would depend on Russia. Russia is not supportive of BTC. It sees it as a U.S. plot to gain control over the Caucasus and cut all links between Moscow of the former Soviet states, building an economic infrastructure that would prevent the former Soviet states to ever reunite with Russia. Moscow also views BTC as a way to weaken its position as major supplier of oil to the European markets. In a recent article at Asia Times Online, John Helmer refers to the BTC project as an effort “to redraw the geography of the Caucasus on an anti-Russian map.”

Another problem BTC poses Russia has to do with its tense relations with Georgia. As it is, the Georgia suffers from many domestic problems: it is emerging from a civil war and is rife with corruption, but perhaps its most serious problem is the growing likelihood of war with Russia over the two breakaway territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The August 8 Moscow News quotes Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili: “If war begins it will be a war between Georgia and Russia, not between the Georgians and Ossetians. … We are very close to a war [with Russia], the population must be prepared.”

As a result of the above Russia will not shed tears if BTC is sabotaged. It might even clandestinely lend its hand to groups that might do just that. Russia might also team up with Iran in an effort to promote the alternative route southward out of the Caspian to the Persian Gulf.

If Russia decides to undermine the project, this will surely have implications on its relations with the U.S. BTC is the linchpin of the shift in U.S. energy policy away from the Middle East and it is in America’s best interest that the project succeeds. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham called the project “one of the most important energy undertakings from America’s point of view.” U.S. Special Forces are already training 1,500-2,000 Georgian soldiers in “anti-terrorism” techniques under a $64 million program initiated in May 2002. In addition, the U.S. provided the Georgian army with new combat helicopters and other weapons. The 17,000 strong Georgian military has many tasks related to the defense of the country from external enemies such as Russia and Armenia but if attacks against the Georgian section of the BTC pipeline are mounted the Georgian military will have to take on the role of protecting the pipeline against saboteurs.

For those who might point to the US providing some military benefits to Georgia as evidence of their tampering in the region – the latest figures I could find suggest the US has provided Georgia with $120 million in troop training and armaments. It is a rather paltry amount compared to the billions of dollars of weapon sales that Russia has recently poured into nearby Iran (and Venezuela).

As a point of comparison, I am trying to imagine what the United States might do if Mexico were to seize some Americans and accuse them of spying. I very much doubt it would involve such a war or words (with veiled accusations towards Russia) or an escalation involving a blockade of Mexico.

(Note: I actually suppose if you consider George Bush to be a complete vassal of Big Oil – that a regional conflict creating uncertaining in the region and driving up oil prices – could be a benefit to those companies. This seems less likely with Bush’s party facing the loss of control in Congress with looming mid-term elections, however).

The first stage of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil export pipeline was officially inaugurated on May 25 at the Sangachal shore terminal, south of Baku. The presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan, as well as BP President Lord John Browne, U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman, State Department South Caucasus Envoy Steven Mann, European Union Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs (of Latvia), Naftohaz Ukrayiny President Oleksiy Ivchenko, and other high-level officials attended. U.S. President George W. Bush, the prime ministers of Britain, Italy, Norway, and Japan (countries whose oil companies are involved in the project), and Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko sent messages underscoring the project’s importance to oil consumer countries. Russia boycotted the inaugural events.

The BTC pipeline consortium is made up of BP with a 30.1% stake as project operator, Azerbaijan’s State Oil Company with 25%, the American companies Unocal (8.9%), Conoco-Phillips (2.5%), and Amerada Hess (2.35%), Norway’s Statoil (8.7%), Turkish Petroleum (6.5%), Italy’s ENI (5%), Total of France (5%), and the Japanese-based Itochu and Inpex with 3.4% and 2.5% stakes, respectively.

The pipeline will carry oil from Azerbaijan’s Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli offshore fields, which hold proven recoverable reserves of 900 million tons of oil. The Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) is developing those fields under the 1994 production-sharing agreement with Azerbaijan, at a cost of $13 billion in investment for the duration the life of the project. AIOC includes BP with a 34.1% stake as project operator, Azerbaijan’s State Oil Company with 10%, Russia’s Lukoil (10%), Statoil (8.6%), the American companies Unocal (10.2%), ExxonMobil (8%), Devon Energy (5.6%), and Amerada Hess (2.7%), Turkish Petroleum (6.8%), and Itochu (3.9%).

Secrets of the Moscow Millionaires’ Club

Short article on the UK Independent about Lena Lenina’s new book Multimillionaires. Apparently the book is based upon Ms. Lenina’s time spent among the wealthy “New Russians“. Everyone who has any familiarity with Russia or Russian friends has heard stories or jokes about the wealthy in Russia and how they spend their money. This book reportedly offers a few of the details of that lifestyle.

The author, Lena Lenina, says that any oligarch worth his caviar owns a minimum of seven cars, employs a staff of 16, owns a yacht at least 170ft in length, a private jet that costs a minimum of £19m, and maintains a deep slush fund for bribing government officials. One apparently confided to her that he had to bribe a circle of corrupt politicians with “more than 1,000 cars and several hundred flats”.

An oligarch spends about £535 every day merely on keeping his favourite mistress in the style to which she is accustomed, according to Ms Lenina. She will be given a sports car (the Audi TT is apparently a favourite) and a £200,000 pied-à-terre in central Moscow. Second-string lovers do less well, having only £2,700 a month spent on them.

The writer argues that many of Russia’s wealthy businessmen have lost their nouveau-riche tastes and become far more sophisticated. While what she calls “provincials” may still plump for a Ferrari, Lamborghini or Maserati, Russia’s urban rich prefer the anonymity of chauffeur-driven Mercedes, BMWs and Audis and spend an average of £425,000 a year on buying such vehicles. An oligarch’s home, she says, is a display of raw wealth: his primary residence is a Moscow penthouse complete with a pool and winter garden and a price tag of up to £5m.

For those interested in such stories, perhaps there are more revealing details contained within the book. Otherwise, it sounds like more idol gossip regarding how extravagantly many wealthy Russians choose to spend their money.